Exporters in the Financial Crisis by Görg, Holge & Spaliara, Marina Eliza
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Görg, Holge, and Spaliara, Marina Eliza (2014) Exporters in the Financial 
Crisis. Working Paper. Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
 
 
Copyright © 2014 The Authors 
 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format 
or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s) 
 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details must be given 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/93337/ 
 
 
 
  Deposited on: 02 May 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
 Exporters in the Financial Crisis 
 
 Holger Görg 
Marina-Eliza Spaliara 
 
No. 1919 | April 2014 
 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiellinie 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1919 | April 2014 
Exporters in the Financial Crisis* 
Holger Görg, and Marina-Eliza Spaliara 
Abstract: 
Using a large panel of UK manufacturing firms over the period 2000—2009, we consider how firms 
responded during the most recent financial crisis, estimating models for export market participation 
decisions and firm growth and survival. The results indicate that financial variables are highly 
important in predicting export market entry, especially in the midst of the global financial crisis. 
With respect to firm growth and survival, we find that starters and continuous exporters are more 
likely to perform well in and out of the crisis than non-exporters. 
Keywords: Exports, financial crisis, financial health. 
JEL classification: F1, L2, G3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Holger Görg 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy; and  
Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel 
Marina-Eliza Spaliara (Correspondence Author) 
University of Glasgow, and  
Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
Email: marina.spaliara@glasgow.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* We would like to thank Rebecca Riley and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions 
on an earlier draft of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers are of a 
preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or caveats before referring to, 
or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author. 
Coverphoto: uni_com on photocase.com 
1 Introduction
Trade was hit hard during the global nancial crisis. Data in the World Trade Report 2012
show that average export growth was around 2 percent and -12 percent, respectively, in 2008
and 2009, and rebounded to + 14 and + 5 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively (WTO
(2012)). Indeed, the drop in trade during the crisis far outpaced the decline in global GDP
(Alfaro and Chen (2012)). There have been various explanations for this trade collapse
during the crisis, attributing it to a strong fall in demand, a rise in protectionism, a domino
eect because of global value chains, or restrictions in the access to nance for exporters
(e.g., Baldwin and Evenett (2009), Chor and Manova (2012) and Bricongne et al. (2012)).
Especially the latter explanation has received much attention in the recent literature.
Corporate funding (or the lack thereof) has also been a major concern for policy makers
during the recent nancial crisis. In the UK, business lending, which has been falling steadily
for the last four years, plunged below 400 billion pounds by the beginning of May 2013. That
is 20% below its level four years ago. Participants in the Funding for Lending Scheme group,
which includes all of the big high-street banks except HSBC, cut credit by $300 mill. in
the rst quarter of 2013 (The Economist (2013)). Bell and Young (2010) nd evidence of a
substantial tightening in credit supply in the UK economy from mid-2007. They argue that
loan spreads on SMEs rose during the crisis period, with syndicated loans spreads presenting
a sharp increase from mid-2008.1 Access to nance remains a major barrier to growth for
more than 1 in 5 UK small rms with 41% of loan applications refused in the 1st quarter of
2012 (Federation of Small Businesses).
According to the nancial accelerator theory, deteriorations in economic conditions in-
crease the cost of nance, which in turn weakens rms' balance sheet positions, thus inu-
encing their activities (Bernanke et al. (1996)). Therefore, the nancial system can generate
an endogenous cycle (the accelerator) that propagates the initial shock over time. It is ev-
1Evidence for Europe provided by Iyer et al. (2014), show that banks decreased their credit supply to
rms during the 2007-09 crisis. The drop in credit supply was stronger for small rms which could not
compensate the reduction in loan supply via other sources of debt.
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ident from recent studies that the collapse of the supply of loans to non-nancial rms has
negatively aected rms' activities (employment, investment, survival prospects) which in
turn led to a sharp drop in economic activity.2 While the deterioration in access to bank
nance aects all rms, it is likely to be particularly severe for exporters since, as Amiti and
Weinstein (2011) discuss, exports are highly dependent on access to nance, much more so
than the domestic operations of rms.
In this paper we look at what happened to exporters during the nancial crisis, using
rm level data for the UK. We investigate whether the entry of new rms into exporting was
aected by the nancial crisis. Furthermore, we compare the performance of exporters in
terms of employment and sales growth, and survival, with that of non-exporters before and
during the crisis.
By doing so, this paper is complementary to some of our earlier work, where we also use
UK rm level data to investigate the link between access to nance and export activity. In
Gorg and Spaliara (2013) we examine the link between rms' nancial health, borrowing
ratio and export market exit, paying special attention to the recent nancial crisis. We
nd, inter alia, that the deterioration in the nancial position of rms has increased the
hazard of export market exit during the crisis. While we look at exiting the export market
in that paper, the present paper considers export market entry, as well as rm growth and
rm survival during the crisis. More recently, Gorg and Spaliara (2014b) assess the role of
dierent exporting statuses in the link between nancial health and rm survival. Results
suggest that good nancial health boosts the survival prospects for continuous exporters and
continuous non-exporters while it has a modest impact on export starters and exiters. In
the present paper we additionally look at dierential survival prospects during the crisis.
Our paper is also related to a wider literature that looks at the link between nance and
exporting at the rm level. For example, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) present a comprehen-
2For example, Chodorow-Reich (2012) nds that the withdrawal of credit explains between 1/3 to 1/2 of
the employment decline of small and medium rms in the US in the year following the collapse of Lehman.
By contrast, the availability of credit supply had no eect on the employment level of large rms.
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sive study of the link between rm's exports at the intensive margin and nance, focusing
on the health of the bank providing access to credit. They look at the Japanese nancial
crisis from 1990 to 2010. Chor and Manova (2012) use product level data on US imports,
investigating the role of credit conditions as the main culprit for reducing trade during the
crisis. Bricongne et al. (2012), using rm level data for France, also investigate the eects
of the crisis, and focus on nancial variables at the rm level. Studies by Askenazy et al.
(2011) and Engel et al. (2013) (also based on French rm level data) further consider the role
of nancial indicators in exporting. The former study assesses theoretically and empirically
the role of credit constrains in export market entry and exit, while the latter investigates the
characteristics of companies deciding to participate in foreign markets and engage in export-
ing or foreign direct investment. There are also other studies which suggest that nancial
health matters in rms' decisions to enter and remain in export markets, see for example
Minetti and Zhu (2011), Bellone et al. (2010), and Greenaway et al. (2007).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and pre-
liminary statistics. The next section models empirically the decision of rms to enter into
export markets, focusing particular on the role of the nancial position. Section 4 examines
performance dierences between dierent types of exporters and non-exporters before and
during the crisis, while Section 5 looks at rm survival and rm's export status. Section 6
concludes.
2 Data and summary statistics
The data set we use in this paper is constructed from the prot and loss and balance sheet
data gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the FAME database. We use
data for the period 2000 - 2009 and dene the crisis years as the period 2008 - 2009. FAME
assigns companies a four-digit UK SIC code which we use to classify rms into industries.
Our sample is limited to rms that operate in the manufacturing industry. Our database
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includes a majority of rms (99.9%) which are not traded on the stock market or which
are not quoted on alternative exchanges such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
and the O-Exchange (OFEX) market. This feature of the data allows for a wide degree
of variation across observations in our sample. A distinctive characteristic is that not only
small and medium sized rms are included in our sample but also some large rms that are
more likely to export.3 Private companies in our data are generally the smallest, youngest,
and most-bank dependent rms. They are therefore more likely than public companies to
face nancial constraints and diculties in accessing bank nance.4
The share of exporting rms in our sample is 52 percent which is comparable to Green-
away et al. (2007) who also use FAME data for UK manufacturing rms. The median UK
rm in our sample has an average of 85 employees, $4.7 mill. assets and $9.5 mill. turnover
which falls in the small and medium-sized enterprise category.5
In order to see what happened to the nancial position of rms in our data set during
the nancial crisis, Figure 1 illustrates the average rm-specic interest rate (dened as the
ratio of interest payments to prot and loss after taxes plus depreciation) paid by rms
between 2000 and 2009. We distinguish rms based on the ratio of short term debt to the
sum of short-term debt and trade credit. Firms with ratios above the median are considered,
for this simple exercise, to be more bank dependent. The gure shows that after steadily
declining since 2001, the interest rate hiked up again in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the
crisis. We also see that, consistently throughout the years, more bank-dependent rms are
faced with a higher borrowing ratio compared to their less bank-dependent counterparts.6
3Exporting is reported as \overseas turnover" and some rms may be exporters, but may fail to report
this.
4To ensure that our sample is representative we contrast it to aggregate data for the UK manufacturing
sector. We compare the growth of protability in our sample with those of the UK manufacturing, as
reported in the ONS database. Our sample is reasonably representative of the broader aggregate. The series
are highly correlated and exhibit similar business cycle dynamics.
5In the UK, sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 dene a SME for the purpose of accounting
requirements. According to this, a small company is one that has a turnover of not more than $6.5 mill., a
balance sheet total of not more than $3.26 mill. and not more than 50 employees. A medium-sized company
has a turnover of not more than $25.9 mill., a balance sheet total of not more than $12.9 mill. and not
more than 250 employees.
6As an alternative measure of bank dependency, we have used the ratio of short term debt to total debt
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Hence, during crisis periods the worsening of the balance sheet position of rms and the
rise in debt servicing costs might be expected to aect rm performance. This is what we
investigate in what follows, with a particular focus on looking at exporters vs non-exporters.
We start with some preliminary statistics before moving on to some econometric estima-
tions. Table 1 gives an indication of the nancial condition of exporters and non-exporters
during tranquil (pre-crisis) and crisis periods. Our nancial crisis dummy (CRISIS) takes
the value one over the period 2008-09, and zero otherwise The data show that, on average,
exporters are less indebted and more liquid compared to non-exporters. This is in line with
Greenaway et al. (2007) and also with the view of much of the recent work on heterogeneous
rms, which shows that exporters are generally the better performing rms in an economy
(e.g., Bernard et al. (2007)). When we distinguish dierent stages of exporting (i.e starters,
exiters, continuers, switchers and non-exporters), we observe that export starters and exiters
display the highest level of debt and the lowest liquidity ratio compared to continuous and
switcher exporters.7 The nding on starters is again in line with Greenaway et al. (2007)
and may indicate the importance of costs that new exporters have to bear, which worsens
their nancial position. The poor nancial health of rms that exit from the export market
may indicate that these are poorly performing rms, which cannot survive in international
competition (see also Girma et al. (2004)).
Comparing the crisis period (2008 - 2009) with the pre-crisis (2000 - 2006), we nd that
all types of rms, exporters and non-exporters alike, display lower values of leverage and
higher levels of liquidity. This would, under normal circumstances, seem to indicate an
improvement in the nancial position of a rm. However, in the wake of the crisis the lower
levels of leverage are consistent with the notion that rms took a substantial amount of
short-term debt in the pre-crisis period and were unable to extend it further in the later
to distinguish between more and less bank dependent rms. This results in a similar picture to that shown
in Figure 1.
7We distinguish exporting rms that continuously export (continuous exporters) from those that start
exporting their products (export starters), that never export their products (continuous non-exporters),
those that fail to continue exporting and exit the exporting market (export exiters), and those that enter
and exit more than once (export switchers).
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years when the nancial crisis hit and bank lending collapsed. In addition, the observations
that liquidity is higher during the crisis than in other times is likely to indicate that rms
boosted their holdings of cash and other liquid assets as a buer due to the uncertainty
in credit markets.8 Mean dierences are statistically signicant in most of the cases, as
indicated by a t-test.
Finally, we perform a univariate analysis in order to look at the survival prospects of
dierent types of exporters taking into account the eects of the 2008-09 crisis. Table 2
shows the proportion of failed and surviving rms by exporting status. The data show, for
example, that 18.6 percent of failed rms and 29.4 percent of all surviving rms are export
starters. Non-exporters account for the largest share of both failing and surviving rms.
When we compare column 1 with column 2 it becomes apparent that starters, continuous
exporters and switchers have a higher probability to survive compared to exiters and non-
exporters.
3 Exporting decision and the nancial position of the
rm
In the rst part of our analysis we consider whether the nancial crisis has had any im-
plications for rms' decisions to enter into export markets. Greenaway et al. (2007) also
use British rm level data from FAME to establish that nancial factors matter for export
decisions of rms. In particular, they show that rms that start exporting generally have
lower liquidity and higher leverage than non-exporters. This may be due to the additional
costs these rms have to bear in order to enter export markets, such as costs for building
up new distribution networks, market research or legal costs. We follow up on their analysis
and consider in particular a rm's decision to start exporting, the role of nancial factors
8According to SEC Filings (Securities and Exchange Commission), the main reason that rms drew down
on the credit line was to enhance their liquidity and nancial exibility during the credit crisis (Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010)).
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in this decision, and whether the role of nancial factors changed during the crisis. In order
to do so, we follow Greenaway et al. (2007) and employ two nancial variables to measure
changes in the nancial health of rms. The rst one is liquidity, which is dened as the
rm's current assets less current liabilities over total assets and is an indicator of the liquid
assets of the rm. The higher the liquidity ratio the better the nancial position of the rm.
The second nancial characteristic is leverage, which is measured as the rm's short-term
debt to assets ratio. A high leverage ratio is associated with a worse balance sheet situation.
This may increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and lead to the inability of
rms to obtain external nance at a reasonable cost.
In a next step, we investigate whether nancial factors determine a rm's decision to
start to export, and whether this relationship has changed during the nancial crisis starting
in 2008. In Table 3, we estimate the probability that a rm that is not an exporter in
time t become an exporter in t+1 conditional on its size and age and, most importantly, its
nancial condition. In particular, we examine the impact of liquidity and leverage on the
likelihood of starting to export before and during the crisis using a probit model.
We observe that liquidity positively aects the likelihood of exporting during tranquil
periods. This is in line with Greenaway et al. (2007) and suggests that more liquid rms
are more likely to be able to pay their sunk cost of entry and start operating abroad. The
statistically insignicant coecient on the term interacting liquidity and a dummy for the
crisis period reveals that the benecial impact of liquidity on exporting is not statistically
dierent during the crisis. This picture is somewhat dierent when we look at the level
of indebtedness of a rm. Leverage has a marginally signicant negative impact on the
probability of exporting outside of the crisis. However, this negative eect increases in
magnitude during the crisis. In other words, indebted companies seem somewhat less likely
to start exporting during tranquil periods. However, this negative eect becomes much
stronger during the crisis. We also nd that the crisis dummy on its own produces a negative
and statistically signicant sign. This implies that, all other things equal, rms are less likely
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to start exporting in the crisis period than before the crisis. As a robustness check we dene
the crisis for the period 2007 - 2009. This does not change our conclusions on the impact of
the crisis or the role of liquidity and indebtedness in and out of the crisis.9
Overall, the results in this section show that fewer rms enter the export market during
the crisis, and that nancial factors do play a signicant role for a rm's decision to start
exporting. The level of a rm's debt is a much stronger deterrent of exporting during the
crisis than in the period before the crisis. This suggests that indebted rms nd it more
dicult to access during the crisis the nancial resources that would allow them to pay the
additional sunk costs of export market entry.
4 Firm growth and exporting
We now turn to investigating what happened to rms after entering the export market. How
do they perform and, perhaps more importantly, how does the performance of exporters
compare to other rms? And, what is the eect of the crisis for exporters and non-exporters?
In order to do so, we attempt to assess the eect of exporting on rm dynamics in terms of
output and employment with a particular emphasis on the recent nancial crisis.
We start by charting the evolution of average sales and employment for dierent types
of rms. In Figures 2 and 3, we distinguish exporters from non-exporters. In Figures 4
and 5 we further distinguish exporters into the four above mentioned categories: continuous
exporters, export starters, export exiters, and switchers.
When we distinguish exporters from non-exporters, we show that the level of sales and
employment are higher for exporters compared to non-exporters throughout the sample.
This is consistent with a large literature that documents performance premia for exporters
vis-a-vis non-exporters in terms of size, productivity, wages, etc. (e.g., Wagner (2007)). A
drop in the series is observed during the crisis years 2008-09. Employment and sales are
lower for both exporters and non-exporters, though the reduction appears to be larger for
9Results are available upon request.
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exporters, reducing the gap between exporters and their non-exporting counterparts. In line
with the aggregate picture, where, as we discussed in the introduction, trade decreased by
more than total GDP world-wide, this suggests that exporting rms suered relatively more
from the crisis in terms of output and employment losses than rms operating purely on the
domestic market.
When we dierentiate between dierent stages of exporting (i.e starters, exiters, contin-
uers, switchers and non-exporters), we observe that continuous exporters display the highest
level of employment and sales followed by starters and switchers. Export exiters and non-
exporters are found at the bottom of the graphs. All types of exporters face a decrease in
employment and sales during the recent nancial crisis.
Next, we consider the role of credit constraints. There is an established literature on
nancing constraints and rms' real activities that was initiated by the inuential work of
Fazzari et al. (1988). Following this literature (e.g, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994); Spaliara
(2009); Spaliara (2011); Mizen and Tsoukas (2012) and Tsoukas and Spaliara (2014)) we
split rms by age into old and young, and by size into large and small.10 The assumption is
that small and young rms are more likely to face credit constraints as it is, all other things
equal, more dicult for them to obtain external nance from banks.11
Based on these categories, we observe the change in the growth of rms when we take into
account credit constraints. In particular, we compare the change in the mean of employment
and sales for small and young rms with the corresponding change for their old and large
counterparts. As one would expect, employment and sales are higher for large and old rms
throughout our sample. Between 2008-09 we witness a drop in both series. This drop appears
to be larger for old and large rms compared to young and small establishments, reducing
10We generate a dummy variable, SMALLit, which is equal to 1 if rm i's real assets are in the bottom
50 percent of the distribution of the real assets of all rms operating to the same industry as rm i in year t,
and equal to 0 otherwise. The dummy Y OUNGit is equal to 1 if age for rm i is in the bottom 50 percent
of the distribution of the age of all rms operating to the same industry as rm i in year t, and equal to 0
otherwise. As a robustness, we also use a 75% cut-o point.
11According to Hadlock and Pierce (2010), rm age and size are the two variables reported by rms
themselves regarding the importance of nancing constraints.
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the gap between nancially constrained and unconstrained rms.
In the last two graphs (gures10 and 11) we consider the average rm's export intensity
and its relationship with rm dynamics. Based on a rm's share of exports in total sales,
we classify rms into high and low export-intensive rms.12 We chart average sales and
employment for these two groups of rms. We observe that higher export intensity is related
to larger sales and employment. However, the gap in sales between high and low intensity
exporters diminished consistently over the 2000s, while the picture is not as clear cut for
employment. Both sales and employment dropped considerably in 2009. In fact, the gap in
employment between high and low intensity exporters all but vanished in 2009 during the
crisis.
Next we provide some additional formal econometric evidence to account for the role of
exporting and the eect of the crisis on rm dynamics. We employ simple OLS regressions
to assess the eect of dierent exporting status on rm dynamics in and out of the crisis.
Time and industry dummies are included to account for business cycle eects and industry
dynamics. Table 5 presents results of explorative regressions where we regress employment
(in column 1) and sales (in column 2), respectively, on dummies for groups of exporting and
a dummy for the crisis period. To capture the indirect eect of the crisis, we interact the
dierent facets of exporting with the crisis dummy. The interaction gauges the change in
exporting groups relative to the reference category, continuous non-exporters, for the crisis
period. The nancial condition of the rm is taking into account by including variables such
as leverage and liquidity. We also control for size and age of the rm.
Results show statistically signicant positive coecients for all dierent types of exporters
during tranquil periods. This implies that compared to non-exporters, all exporter categories
have higher levels of employment and sales. In other words, there are performance dierences
in line with the literature (e.g., Wagner 2007). Comparing the coecients for the dierent
groups, we nd that the positive relationship with employment and sales appears strongest
12Firms having a high share of exports in total sales and whose ratio is at the top 50% (75%) of the
distribution, are classied as high export-intensive.
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for continuous exporters and switchers rather than for starters and exiters. This is in line
with the ideas of sunk costs of export entry and performance disadvantages for export exiters.
However, the interaction terms are largely statistically insignicant. When the crisis is
dened dierently (2007-09) some interesting results emerge.13 We nd that the performance
advantage for export starters and continuous exporters is stronger during the crisis, at least
in terms of employment. Hence, in contrast to the descriptive evidence in the gures above,
this suggests that the gap between export starters and continuous, respectively, and non-
exporters is larger during the crisis period than out of it. Hence, these types of exporters
appear to have fared better during the crisis than the average non-exporter. By contrast, the
performance dierence between export switchers and non-exporters has diminished during
the crisis, while there is no statistically signicant dierence in the link between export and
performance in and out of the crisis for rms that exit the export market. Hence, in order
to discern a dierential impact of the crisis for dierent types of exporters, it is crucial how
one denes the timing of the recent nancial crisis.
5 The hazard of failure and exporting
In the nal part of the analysis we look at the survival prospects of dierent types of exporters
taking into consideration the eects of the recent crisis. We therefore turn to estimating the
hazard of rm failure conditional on the export status of rms during and outside the crisis.
As in Gorg and Spaliara (2013, 2014), we use a complementary log-log model (cloglog), a
discrete time version of the Cox proportional hazard model in order to model rm survival.
We include dummies for dierent export statuses (starter, continuous, exiter, switcher) as
in Table 5 and also control for the nancial position of the rm by including measures of
leverage and liquidity. Furthermore, we control for size and age of the rm.
Looking at the estimation results in Table 6, we nd that export starters, continuous
exporters and export switchers are more likely to survive than non-exporters (the reference
13Results are available upon request.
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category). By contrast, rms that exit the export market are also more likely to die than non-
exporters. These coecients are not statistically signicantly dierent during the crisis and
non-crisis periods for all groups but one. In particular, continuous exporters are even more
likely to survive than non-exporters during the nancial crisis.14 This might be due to their
good nancial health and established reputation in the exporting market. The crisis dummy
on its own is statistically signicant indicating that deteriorations in economic activity will
aect rms' prospects of survival negatively. Furthermore, we nd that nancial factors
play a role for rm survival; more liquid rms and rms with lower leverage, respectively,
are more likely to survive.This result does not change when redening the crisis dummy for
2007 - 2009.
6 Conclusion
Firms'ability to raise external nance has always been an important issue in the corporate
nance literature. The recent global nancial crisis has re-ignited interest in this link, since
there is evidence that banks interrupted their lines of credit and rms were unable or had
to incur substantial costs in order to nance their operations. The present paper relies on a
large panel of UK rms, the vast majority of which are unlisted, to explore the importance of
nancial health for a number of rms' decisions. We begin our enquiry by examining whether
the entry of new rms into exporting was aected by the nancial crisis. We then compare
the performance of exporters in terms of employment and sales growth, and survival, with
that of non-exporters before and during the crisis.
The analysis nds evidence that nancial variables are important in predicting export
entry, especially in the midst of the global nancial crisis. More importantly, the level of
a rm's debt is a much stronger deterrent of exporting during the crisis than in the period
before the crisis. With respect to rm dynamics, we nd that starters and continuous
14This is somewhat in contrast to a similar study for the Republic of Ireland (Godart et al. (2012)) which
nds that exporting rms are indeed more likely to die than non-exporting rms during the crisis.
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exporters are more likely to perform well in and out of the crisis than non-exporters.
There are a number of interesting policy implications arising from our ndings, which
are of relevance to policy makers and rms' managers seeking to understand the mechanism
through which nancial health aects rms' performance. First, the results presented in
this paper suggest that maintaining healthy balance sheets would substantially increase
the probability of exporting and ultimately help rms weather the negative eects of a
nancial crisis. Thus, in good times rms should build up liquidity buers which can be
used during recessions, in order to perform well throughout the cycle. Second, given the
apparent importance of a healthy balance sheet position, managers should actively pursue
the communication of managerial statements of liquidity to both investors and lenders as a
signal of their company's nancial health.
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Figure 2: Log of sales for exporters and non−exporters
18
4
4.
5
5
5.
5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
year
emp_export emp_nonexport
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Figure 4: Log of sales for exporters with different status
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Figure 5: Log of employement for exporters with different status
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Figure 6: Log of sales for old and young firms
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Figure 8: Log of sales  for large and small firms
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Figure 10: Log sales for high and low export intensity
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Figure 11: Log employment for high and low export intensity
Table 1: Summary Statistics by exporting status before and during the 2008-09 crisis
Leverage Liquidity Leverage Leverage Di. Liquidity Liquidity Di.
Crisis non-crisis Crisis non-crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exporters 0.436 0.180 0.414 0.440 0.032 0.231 0.169 0.000
(0.74) (0.32) (0.52) (0.77) (0.34) (0.32)
Continuous non  Exporters 0.515 0.150 0.512 0.516 0.983 0.179 0.165 0.000
(16.89) (0.32) (5.15) (18.21) (0.33) (0.32)
Starters Exporters 0.423 0.164 0.411 0.425 0.266 0.215 0.158 0.000
(0.778) (0.323) (0.53) (0.81) (0.34) (0.32)
Continuous Exporters 0.410 0.209 0.359 0.421 0.000 0.266 0.153 0.000
(0.56) (0.30) (0.31) (0.60) (0.33) (0.32)
Exiters Exporters 0.493 0.164 0.423 0.499 0.259 0.238 0.153 0.000
(5.12) (0.33) (0.44) (5.35) (0.36) (0.32)
Switchers Exporters 0.417 0.176 0.413 0.418 0.843 0.232 0.157 0.000
(0.42) (0.33) (0.54) (0.40) (0.33) (0.32)
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The p-values of a test of the equality
of means before and after the crisis are reported in columns 5 and 8. Leverage is measured as the rm's short-term debt to
assets ratio. Liquidity is dened as the ratio of the rm's current assets less current liabilities over total assets. Exporters are
dened as those rms that report a positive amount of exports throughout the sample period. The time period is 2000-2009.
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Table 2: Surviving and failing by exporting status
Failed Firms Surviving Firms Di.
(1) (2) (3)
Starters Exporters 0.186 0.294 0.000
(0.389) (0.45)
Continuous Exporters 0.001 0.063 0.000
(0.02) (0.24)
Exiters Exporters 0.211 0.125 0.000
(0.41) (0.33)
Switchers Exporters 0.048 0.066 0.000
(0.21) (0.25)
Continuous non  Exporters 0.602 0.517 0.000
(0.48) (0.49)
Notes: Fail is a dummy that equals 1 if a rm fails in year t, and 0 otherwise. The p-values of a test of equality are reported in
column (3). The percentages do not add to exactly 1.0 due to very little overlap in the construction of the export dummies.
Table 3: Probability to start exporting during the crisis
Liquidity 0.221***
(4.28)
Leverage -0.068*
(-1.68)
Liquidity Crisis2 0.025
(0.35)
Leverage Crisis2 -0.058*
(-1.87)
Size 0.192***
(18.78)
Age 0.000
(0.12)
Crisis -0.109***
(-3.18)
Observations 46,429
Estimates are obtained from a pooled Probit model. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. The gures reported in
parentheses are t-statistics. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies and industry
dummies were included in the specication.
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Table 4: Summary of graphical evidence
Covariates Analysis of series Graphical evidence
Log of sales Exporters/non-exporters Higher for exporters
Exporters with dierent status Lower for exiters and higher for continuous exporters
Old/young Higher for old rms
Large/Small Higher for large rms
Export Intensity Higher for high intensity exporters
Log of Employement Exporters/non-exporters Higher for exporters
Exporters with dierent status Lower for exiters and higher for continuous exporters
Old/young and Higher for old rms
Large/Small Higher for large rms
Export Intensity Higher for high intensity exporters
25
Table 5: Firm growth and exporting during the crisis
Log of employment Log of sales
(1) (2)
Starters Exporters 0.017** 0.031***
(2.15) (3.41)
Continuous Exporters 0.085*** 0.105***
(2.95) (8.21)
Exiters Exporters 0.054* 0.072***
(1.85) (7.23)
Switchers Exporters 0.073*** 0.089***
(2.62) (3.77)
Starters Exporters*Crisis 0.008 0.015
(0.23) (0.71)
Continuous Exporters*Crisis 0.014 0.019
(0.27) (0.61)
Exiters Exporters*Crisis -0.031 -0.062*
(-0.57) (-1.90)
Switchers Exporters*Crisis -0.007 -0.023
(-0.11) (-0.67)
Crisis -0.170*** 0.190***
(-5.85) (10.26)
Leverage -0.044*** -0.027***
(-7.33) (-8.77)
Liquidity 0.011 0.001
(0.55) (0.08)
Size 0.756*** 0.844***
(213.85) (397.25)
Age 0.001 0.001***
(0.24) (8.71)
Observations 38,276 37,294
Notes: All specications were estimated using the OLS regressions. The gures reported in parentheses are t-statistics. *
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all
specications.
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Table 6: Hazard of failure by exporting status during the crisis
Starters Exporters -0.431***
(-10.90)
Continuous Exporters -5.983***
(-15.15)
Exiters Exporters 0.449***
(12.88)
Switchers Exporters -0.182**
(-2.95)
Starters Exporters*Crisis 0.229
(1.20)
Continuous Exporters*Crisis -0.895***
(-4.85)
Exiters Exporters*Crisis 0.338
(0.97)
Switchers Exporters*Crisis -0.101
(-1.15)
Crisis 0.765***
(2.58)
Leverage 0.048*
(1.269)
Liquidity -1.018***
(2.25)
Size -0.239***
(6.35)
Age -0.00
(0.42)
Observations 46,429
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the rm fails, and 0
otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. *: signicant at 10%; **: signicant at 5%; ***: signicant at 1%.
Time and industry dummies are included in all models.
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